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Authors’ note
The authors would like to stress that 
this methodology is not a tool that 
will provide precise answers from 
information inputs. It is intended to be 
a guide to thinking through the process 
of policy development in the context 
of access to genetic resources so as to 
promote the effectiveness of the resulting 
regimes in the situations in which they 
are required to function.
The conceptual development of 
this methodology has been a complex 
process, both in agreeing on its structure 
and in conveying sometimes difficult 
abstract concepts in understandable 
language. As such, it does not represent 
the consensus view of all authors on 
all detailed points, but nevertheless 
provides a general approach on which 
all authors were able to agree.
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Introduction
Access to genetic resources and sharing 
the benefits derived from their use—
referred to in short-hand as ‘access and 
benefit sharing’ or ABS—has become 
the most widely discussed issue 
emerging from the entry into force of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in 1993. Subsequently, over the 
past decade, a large number of related 
national, regional and international, 
binding and non-binding, legal 
instruments and policies have been 
developed and put into place.
Although a comprehensive assess-
ment of the impacts of existing ABS 
legislation and policies has not yet 
been completed, it is safe to say that 
their impacts have been mixed, at best. 
They do appear to have increased 
awareness among a broad range of 
stakeholders with an interest in genetic 
resources of the importance of genetic 
resources in general, including their 
role in biotechnology development, 
their relation to traditional indigenous 
knowledge and intellectual property 
(IP), their links to the biosafety debate, 
and the need to establish some kind of 
benefit-sharing scheme to redistribute 
benefits associated with their use. That 
said, some would argue that most 
ABS laws have also contributed to 
perpetuating an unfortunately wide-
spread, exaggerated sense of the market 
value of genetic resources.
Discussions within a number of 
policy-setting international forums 
since 1993—e.g. the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO); the 
Council for the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement); the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), the Governing Body of 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(PGRFA) (‘International Treaty’)—have 
reflected a growing preoccupation with 
ABS issues.
Currently, some of the best known 
and most widely referenced ABS-related 
laws include:
•	 Executive order no. 247, 18 May 1995 of 
the Philippines. Prescribing guidelines 
and establishing a regulatory 
framework for the prospecting of 
biological and genetic resources, 
their by-products and derivatives, for 
scientific and commercial purposes; 
and for other purposes.
•	 Andean Community Decision 391 on a 
Common Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources (1996).
•	 Law 7788 of Costa Rica. Biodiversity 
Law (1998).
•	 Organization of African Unity Model 
Legislation for the Protection of 
the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers and Breeders and the 
Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources (1998).
•	 Provisional Measure 2.126–16 of Brazil 
on Access to Genetic Resources (2001).
Non-binding ABS (and IP-related) 
instruments also abound worldwide, 
including the Bonn Guidelines on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilization (2002) and various 
international codes of conduct and 
principles, and institutional policy 
declarations—all with some bearing on 
the activities of countries, companies, 
research institutions, museums, NGOs 
and indigenous peoples as they relate 
to access and use of biodiversity and its 
components, including genetic resources 
(and related traditional knowledge).
Most national legislation and 
regulations in force or in the making, 
as far as the authors are aware, with 
the exception of those implementing 
the International Treaty (which has a 
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very particular approach to regulating 
ABS), are very similar in form and 
content.
The three main objectives of the 
CBD are the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
use of genetic resources. Experience to 
date (even if not fully corroborated by 
detailed in-depth studies) demonstrates 
that something in the content, structure 
or development process of these ABS 
regimes is impeding them from having 
the intended effect in terms of satisfying 
the objectives of the CBD in general, 
and the equitable sharing of benefits in 
particular.
Notwithstanding the efforts and 
advances made over the past decade 
in the policy and legal arena, regions 
and countries have faced considerable 
difficulties in the preparation and 
implementation of these policy and 
legal instruments. Whether due to need 
for additional political support at the 
national level; need for further human 
and institutional capacity within the 
countries developing the instrument; 
excessive expectations by policy-makers 
and national entities concerning the 
potential benefits to be derived from the 
application of ABS regulations; lack of 
institutional mechanisms to enforce the 
regime established; or misconceptions 
about what policy and legislation may 
be able to achieve in reality, experience 
since 1993 suggests that many of these 
policies, laws and regulations have 
limitations that prevent the expected 
results and successes.
Policy and legal measures seek to 
change and alter reality, but, at the 
same time, need to be informed and 
influenced by it in order be effective. 
Implementation difficulties usually arise 
because either:
1. laws are totally disconnected from 
the reality they seek to influence (i.e. 
they often unintentionally do not take 
into account social, economic, cultural, 
political, scientific or institutional 
realities at a given time);
2. they are technically flawed in their 
content or impose burdens that 
significantly elevate transaction costs; 
or
3. their process of development has not 
integrated and adequately internalized 
the interests and needs of key actors 
towards whom these laws are directed 
(the main beneficiaries).
It is in this context that the project 
Exploring Options to Implement the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture 
and Article 15.2 of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity proposed a 
conceptual and practical exercise to 
assist countries in developing their 
ABS policies and in a manner such 
that they can be more effective once 
implemented, and simultaneously 
also to aid in reviewing existing ABS 
policies and laws.
Far from being a menu of options from 
which a solution may be identified and 
‘picked’ or a set of alternatives or models 
to be chosen among, this methodology 
stresses the process and reasoning behind 
the options and alternatives identified, 
and aims to establish a methodology 
by which these options may be tested 
(conceptually and in practice) against 
social, economic, institutional, policy, 
scientific and legal considerations, 
according to each country’s specific 
needs and interests.
The methodology has three phases, 
consisting of ten steps in total, which do 
not necessarily have to flow sequentially. 
It can be used in the generation of 
new policies or laws; alternatively, it 
could also be applied in the context 
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of evaluating existing policies and 
legislation to identify where gaps, 
administrative burdens and transaction 
costs in general may be negatively 
affecting implementation.
Part I: Policy analysis: 
defining objectives
The starting point for the development 
of any policy or regulatory framework 
is to have a clear idea of what it 
is supposed to achieve. A law or 
policy that is developed with undue 
haste, without careful and deliberate 
consideration of what it should and can 
reasonably achieve, in many instances is 
likely to prove redundant or, at worst, 
destructive. Experience demonstrates 
that many national access laws are often 
developed in haste in response to a 
particular political, widely publicized, 
event. Determining the purpose of the 
ABS regime one seeks to develop is 
analogous to laying the foundations of 
a house: the foundations determine not 
only the nature and character of a house, 
but also its quality in terms of durability 
and adaptability. To stretch the analogy 
a little further: any additional time 
and effort devoted to the laying of 
foundations is, almost invariably, 
directly rewarded in terms of the quality 
of the final structure.
These first two steps of the 
methodology focus on the process of 
determining, first, the primary purpose, 
and, second, the component objectives of 
any potential ABS law. These two steps 
are complemented by the exercise of 
identifying, gathering and synthesizing 
relevant baseline information—inform-
ation that informs what the objectives of 
the law should be, and can be used to 
check whether the objectives identified 
potentially respond to the on-the-ground 
realities of the community, country or 
region concerned. In an ideal world, all 
relevant background data would already 
be fully appreciated by a wide range of 
stakeholders before any decisions about 
the objective (or any other elements) 
of an ABS regime are decided upon. 
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However, as we discuss below, decisions 
to put ABS laws in place are often made 
at high levels of government without 
much—or indeed any—guidance about 
the actual structure or content of the 
regime to be developed, leaving lower-
level functionaries and legal experts 
to work out the details. As a result, 
too often those with responsibility 
for actually drafting legislative or 
regulatory instruments will not have 
all the information they need to make 
fully informed decisions. The second-
best situation is therefore that drafters 
should have the ability to circle back 
from time to time, collecting situation-
specific data to inform the tailoring of 
the various elements into a balanced 
and comprehensive law or regulation. 
The authors of this document are aware, 
however, that most legal drafters in 
most countries do not have the financial 
or human resources to gather and fully 
consider the implications of data in 
this way. As a result, drafters often find 
themselves in the unenviable position 
of having to make assumptions in the 
absence of sufficient and reliable data. 
The theme of collecting baseline data to 
inform decision-making will reappear in 
Parts II and III, below.
Step 1. Determining the 
purpose or high-level 
objectives
It is important to note that there are 
three basic sources for impetus to 
develop an ABS law or policy, and that 
the content of the objective(s) is likely 
to be influenced by whichever of those 
sources predominates.
Sources of impetus
The three main sources of the impetus to 
develop an ABS policy or law are:
National government, through:
•	 National Biodiversity Strategies and 
Action Plans (NBSAPs);
•	 framework statutory provisions;
•	 executive decisions; and
•	 national undertakings to which the 
country has adhered.
Technical agencies, and motives include:
•	 need to regulate research;
•	 need to control existing activities 
that depend upon access to genetic 
resources; and
•	 interest in potential income-generating 
activities.
Special-interest groups addressing:
•	 protection of heritage or patrimony;
•	 equity through benefit sharing;
•	 income diversification; and
•	 predictability in the regulatory frame-
work.
Typical cross-cutting conceptual 
elements to be considered when defining 
the purpose of the legislation include:
•	 promoting the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity;
•	 reacting to concerns over biopiracy;
•	 promoting food security and agri-
cultural research;
•	 facilitating community development; 
and
•	 promoting equity in natural resources 
exploitation.
Government-derived aims
National governments’ decisions to 
develop a national ABS framework often 
take the form of elements of NBSAPs, 
but may also come from framework 
environmental laws or executive 
instructions. In these instances, the 
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relevant documents or decisions become 
the basis for the policy development 
process. However, statutory mandates or 
executive decisions often lack specificity, 
and therefore supplementary research 
to clarify the reasoning and motivations 
underlying the initial governmental 
stimulus may be necessary. In such cases, 
it is necessary to consider other sources 
of the impetus to create an ABS law, 
namely technical agencies and special-
interest groups.
Technical agencies
Commonly, it is an environment authority 
that is the technical agency with the 
most obvious interest in the regulation 
of ABS, deriving from its usual role as 
the lead national implementing agency 
for the CBD. However, protected-areas 
authorities, agricultural regulatory 
authorities, public research institutions, 
universities and other organizations will 
frequently have strong interests in the 
content of ABS law. Bad experiences with, 
or a desire to promote, bioprospection 
are frequently a motivation for the 
involvement of such organizations. 
Such motivation is obviously legitimate, 
but note that, if their motives have 
not been critically and fully analyzed, 
they can be sources of short-termist 
approaches that may prove prejudicial 
in the medium to longer term, or may 
even be counterproductive.
For example, experiences concerning 
activities that are perceived as abusive 
often lead to restrictive or burdensome 
regulatory regimes as a means of 
stemming the particular activity. 
However, such an approach can have 
inadvertent side effects. One such side 
effect is that is that the flow of resources 
is significantly curtailed or stopped 
completely, along with the research that 
is dependent on it, and consequently, 
related local or global benefits.1 This 
effect has been experienced in many 
fields of technology where excess 
government regulation has influenced or 
distorted research paths and agendas.2 
The second effect is that those seeking 
access are actually encouraged to avoid 
or evade the system, as the benefits 
are outweighed by the burden of 
compliance. This latter effect is possible 
in situations where monitoring and 
enforcement capacities are limited, and 
can be exacerbated if many actors are 
not somehow encouraged to perceive 
avoidance or evasion as ‘wrong’ because 
they are accustomed to relatively 
open access to the genetic resources 
in question, or because they are not 
actually breaking one country’s law by 
seeking the resource in another.
Agricultural research authorities 
are, increasingly, initiators in the 
development of ABS regimes. The reason 
for this is that, despite the occasional 
prominent headlines featuring other 
sectors, the agricultural sector has 
what is arguably the longest history of 
systematically moving genetic resources 
within and across national borders. 
This history continues today, with the 
International Agricultural Research 
Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) annually providing 
approximately 80 000 samples—from a 
total ‘in-trust’ collection of over 600 000 
accessions—from their collections each 
year. Other collections are also active. 
During the 1990s, approximately 16 300 
samples of ten different crops were 
distributed internationally each year 
from collections in the USA. During 
the same period, the Netherlands 
distributed approximately 2200 samples 
per year; the Nordic Gene Bank 
distributed 1550 samples per year; 
Brazil distributed 2200 samples per 
year; and Canada 1500 samples per year, 
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all internationally (i.e., outside their 
own borders).3 There is also evidence 
that, in a number of countries, there are 
high levels of distributions from ex situ 
collections to researchers, breeders and 
conservationists.4 Crop improvement 
and regional genetic resources networks 
also play an important role in facilitating 
the movement of significant amounts 
of material. The preservation and pro-
motion of this pattern of exchange 
was the primary motivation for the 
development of the International Treaty, 
which, at the time of writing, had 
just passed the landmark of its 104th 
ratification. The entry into force in 2004 
of this international framework for ABS 
relating to plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, expressly designed 
to be in harmony with and mutually 
reinforce the CBD, has provided an 
added stimulus for the development 
of corresponding national and regional 
regimes.
Due to differences in the volumes 
of activity and, very often, levels of 
capital and profit margins, between 
the ABS interests of the agricultural 
and the environmental sectors, these 
interests are often perceived to be at 
odds. The agricultural sector tends to 
prefer a relatively open system with 
minimal transaction costs, as illustrated 
by the International Treaty, while the 
environmental sector tends to prefer 
an approach based on case-by-case 
negotiations as a means of maximizing 
opportunities to capture benefits, as 
illustrated by the bilaterally-oriented 
regimes developed by most countries 
and regions to date. However, this 
potential conflict only exists if one takes 
a monolithic view of access to genetic 
resources. It is quite possible to develop 
access regimes that accommodate both 
restrictive and more open approaches 
according to particular needs. Indeed, 
any country that implements the 
International Treaty while maintaining 
a bilateral regime for resources other 
than plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture would be doing exactly 
this. Even prior to the adoption of 
the International Treaty text in 2001, 
the majority of countries that had 
developed ABS regimes had begun to 
experiment with graduated regimes, 
most commonly by making distinctions 
between academic and non-academic 
applicants. To date, at least three bases 
for distinctions have been used in 
different national and international 
regimes:
•	 the nature of the applicant, e.g. 
academic versus non-academic;
•	 the intended use of the genetic resource, 
e.g. research, training, or breeding for 
food and agriculture; and
•	 the physical nature or category of the 
resource, e.g. marine versus terrestrial 
origin, or higher plants versus 
microorganisms.
Interestingly, despite a trend in 
legislative drafting to focus on the 
physical nature of genetic resources in 
the context of definitions, distinctions 
based on physical nature and the 
definitions developed from it were, prior 
to the distinctive treatment of PGRFA 
under the International Treaty, the rarest 
of three options presented here.5 These 
distinctions are not mutually exclusive; 
for example, the International Treaty 
refers to PGRFA that are used for the 
purposes of research, conservation and 
training. Nonetheless, when blending 
them in a regulatory regime, one needs 
to pay particular attention to avoiding 
either overlaps or gaps that might 
undermine effectiveness.
Special-interest groups
A wide range of special-interest groups 
may have objectives relating to the 
Methodology for Developng ABS Laws
development of ABS policies and 
regulatory frameworks. The broad range 
of public and private sector interests—
from plant breeding, to developing 
pharmacological agents, to pollution 
control—mean that it is impossible 
to provide an exhaustive list of the 
interests and interest groups that may 
coalesce around ABS regulatory issues 
in a community, country or region. 
However, in an attempt to highlight 
some concerns, three subcategories of 
special-interest groups are considered 
here: non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), rural communities, and the 
private sector.
NGO6 objectives may have reactive 
or proactive objectives. Reactive object-
ives may include seeking to limit 
perceived irregular access to genetic 
resources or inequitable benefit sharing, 
while proactive objectives usually 
revolve around the enhancement of 
rural livelihoods through income 
diversification. It is important to keep 
in mind that NGOs are not, at least 
theoretically, special-interest groups 
per se, but rather they are organizations 
that are established to represent, directly 
or indirectly, special-interest groups. 
Therefore, to adequately understand, 
or gain a better perspective of, NGO 
objectives, some understanding of their 
intended constituency is also often 
necessary. Even where NGO objectives 
may not have directly contributed to the 
decision to develop an ABS framework, 
it can be rewarding to actively seek 
their input as early as the point of 
identification of the objectives of the 
intended legislation. Depending upon 
the context and the particular NGO, 
they can provide information ranging 
from technical or commercial data to 
insights on community perspectives 
and the potential viability of particular 
mechanisms.
Although NGOs may provide 
insights on community perspectives, it 
is also helpful to seek more direct inputs 
from the communities themselves 
and, ideally, in all but the smallest 
countries, this may require some form 
of local-level consultation. This can be 
challenging, but direct rural community 
input into the process of identifying and 
developing locally sensible objectives of 
an ABS regime can have the dual benefits 
of enhancing the perceived legitimacy of 
the regime put in place and, in the longer 
run, its enforceability.
Of all types of special-interest 
group, the private sector is probably 
the most underestimated in terms of 
its complexity. Depending upon one’s 
perspective, it is also often the most 
underrated in terms of its importance 
for ABS. With the exception of a 
handful of large-scale, public-sector 
projects7, the private sector is the 
primary means of generating benefits, 
in particular financial benefits, from 
genetic resources. Part of the complexity 
of private-sector interests derives 
from the varied applications for which 
genetic resources may be used. Different 
applications may require varying levels 
of capital and technological input, and 
generate similarly varying profits. In 
addition, private-sector companies with 
established interests in genetic resources 
vary enormously in scale, from relatively 
small start-ups and natural-product 
enterprises, to giant pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical corporations. There can be 
fundamentally different views between 
those companies that operate primarily 
at national or regional level and those that 
are genuinely global in operation. The 
private sector is often the most difficult 
special-interest group to actively engage 
in ABS policy processes. Private-sector 
interest in the development of policies 
or regulatory frameworks usually 
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focuses on the issue of predictability 
and efficiency. The clearer and simpler 
a process for access to genetic resources, 
and the more certain and defined the 
rights and benefit-sharing commitments 
that result from it, the more attractive 
the situation is likely to be for private-
sector investment.
In general terms, the main challenge 
in engaging special-interest groups lies 
in the fact that, unlike policy-makers, 
only occasionally are they concerned 
with achieving compromise solutions, 
and tend to view policy development as 
a zero-sum game between themselves 
and governmental authorities, who 
they perceive as either being unduly 
influenced by other interest groups, or 
acting as a final arbiter among competing 
and strongly stated opinions. Of course, 
not all special interest groups pursue their 
own objectives with identical strategies, 
and forms of competition between ideas 
and interests, leading to a compromise 
solution, is the philosophical basis of 
much of democratic policy-making.
Identifying the conceptual scope
Broad-level aims or objectives are 
usually relatively simple to identify and, 
perhaps because of this, are often taken 
for granted. Where there is no more than 
a simple instruction from a high-level 
government body to develop an ABS 
framework, a process such as a SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats) analysis focusing on ABS 
regulation in the particular context 
of the community, country or region 
concerned may prove a useful starting 
point. However, whether there is only 
a simple instruction or more detailed 
terms of reference to work with, some 
form of consultation and research 
process should also be coordinated by the 
authority developing the law to gather 
baseline data of the nature discussed 
earlier, without which it is difficult 
(or impossible) to identify relevant 
and practical objectives. Workshop 
conclusions or research reports can 
be useful sources of information, 
but interviews or small meetings are 
usually the most appropriate means 
for identifying actual aims or intended 
outcomes. Interviews and meetings 
allow full discussion of appropriateness 
of the tentatively identified objectives 
in the circumstances of the community, 
country or region concerned. It should be 
noted that several of the most commonly 
stated broad-level aims in national ABS 
policies and laws derive directly from 
international agreements, sometimes 
verbatim. The most commonly cited 
international agreements in this regard 
are the CBD and the subsequent Bonn 
Guidelines, and, more recently, the 
International Treaty. In this context, it is 
important to note that it is not sufficient 
to simply state that the objective of 
any national ABS law is to implement 
international obligations pursuant to 
the CBD or International Treaty. To do 
so would be to short circuit the thought 
process that is required to develop an 
appropriately tailored regime. Of course, 
countries have obligations to implement 
international agreements that they have 
ratified; at the same time, however, it 
is clear that the means by which those 
obligations can be most efficiently and 
effectively implemented can only be 
understood by going through a process 
of examination of the underlying 
objectives of those international 
agreements. Therefore, where a handed-
down government directive is to 
‘implement international obligations’, it 
may be necessary to examine the texts or 
rationales underlying these obligations 
to accurately identify objectives at the 
national and community levels.
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Step 2. Component 
objectives within the 
identified purpose
The second step of the methodology 
focuses on identifying component or 
subobjectives of the overall purpose 
or objective identified in the first step. 
Where the identification of the overall 
purpose can be compared with the 
preparation of the foundations for a 
house, then the identification of the 
component objectives may be compared 
with the plan of that house, or the basic 
structure of walls and windows: they 
provide the map and frame the detailed 
elements of any resulting law or policy, 
and hence the clearer they are, the more 
efficient the structure. In addition, the 
component objectives provide a more 
detailed view of what the various 
aspects of any resulting law or policy are 
intended to achieve.
Component objectives are shaped by 
national experiences and situations in a 
way that the overall purpose often is not. 
They describe the rationale underlying the 
larger proposed purpose in more detailed 
terms and provide the basic ‘instructions’ 
for what a policy or regulatory regime 
should achieve. Component objectives are 
situation-specific because they focus on 
significance in a national context and what 
might be required to satisfy the proposed 
overall purpose. This is in essence the 
translation of somewhat abstract political 
concepts into practical potential actions. 
Note that some of the most immediately 
obvious component objectives may require 
further division into sub-components to 
provide a reasonably coherent final set of 
component objectives to be included in the 
law (and that can be acted upon in the later 
steps of the development methodology).
For example, for any country 
adopting ‘conservation of genetic 
resources’ as an initial overall purpose 
or objective, identifying the resources 
present and information regarding 
their conservation status is likely to be a 
Example: Seychelles. 
Purpose
Promote the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources.
Provide facilitated access to and utilization of genetic resources.
Limit or prevent access to and utilization of genetic resources other than in accordance with the 
regulatory regime.
Ensure fair and equitable sharing of the benefits resulting from facilitated access to and utilization of 
genetic resources.
Component objectives
Identify and know available resources; ensure use is within yield potentials; promote foreign access; 
promote domestic use and development; restrict irregular or unmonitored access within cost and 
capacity limitations; enhance domestic capacity for use; ensure domestic access to agricultural 
resources; maximize overall potential of benefit-sharing options; promote inter-state collaboration; 
develop, enrich and promote implementation of CBD and the International Treaty.
Information check
To what degree do components of the identified purpose reflect actual national and institutional 
experiences and aims, as opposed to assumed ‘generic’ aims adopted from international 
discourse?
If they are internationally derived aims, how are they reflected at national level?
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primary objective. However, at the level 
of component objectives, the country-
specific question of the scope and quality 
of existing taxonomic and status data 
becomes relevant to deciding whether 
the component objective becomes to 
further develop data collection, to 
improve the coordination and analysis 
of existing data, or simply to ensure 
that the implementation of ABS policy 
is tightly linked with authorities 
generating and monitoring data that are 
already adequate.
Similarly, any country that identifies 
‘agricultural research’ in the form 
of traditional plant breeding as an 
initial overall purpose might have 
maximizing access to a diversity of 
germplasm as a primary objective. At 
the level of component objectives, this 
might translate into a need to ensure 
accessibility to information regarding 
germplasm available in the country, 
to further the development of existing 
collections and breeding programmes, or 
to facilitate access to exotic germplasm.
The component objectives in these 
examples are not mutually exclusive. 
Some countries might wish to include all 
the component objectives (and possibly 
others) included in the examples above.
The principle idea behind step 2 
is that of moving from the general 
language of an intention or insruction, 
or its primary objectives, to a more 
specific definition of what an ABS 
regime is intended to do. As with step 
1, some component objectives may be 
readily available from existing policies 
or decisions, such as NBSAPs or policies 
for the implementation of the Global 
Plan of Action for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(GPA). However, even where this 
is the case, some form of analysis is 
recommended to ensure that component 
objectives fully reflect nationally-
determined priorities—priorities that 
may go beyond the scope of NBSAPs or 
the GPA.
It should be recognized that, as noted 
in step 1, the process of identifying 
component objectives can be variably 
complex, depending upon the level of 
detail provided by the terms of reference 
for the framework-development exer-
cise. In countries where the initial terms 
of reference are relatively specific, the 
concepts of primary and component 
objectives as discussed here could be 
almost synonymous, but where the 
starting point is more of a generalized 
statement or non-specific directive, 
detailed analysis and consultation 
becomes desirable, if not obligatory.
There are two fundamental questions 
when identifying component objectives.
Example:
Possible purpose Possible component objectives
Promote the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity
•	 Prevent depletion of diversity of genetic resources.
•	 Facilitate income-generating projects based on genetic 
resources.
•	 Inventory genetic resources.
Promote food security and 
agricultural research
•	 Prevent erosion of the diversity of farmers’ varieties of key 
crops.
•	 Facilitate access to broad diversity of genetic resources for 
key crops.
•	 Promote access to technology and training.
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The first question is whether the needs 
of different sectors or types of genetic 
resource lead to different component 
objectives. The clearest example of 
this situation can be found in the 1997 
Nairobi Declaration’s recognition that 
the provisions of the CBD did not 
adequately address some aspects of 
the needs of the agricultural sector, 
leading to the subsequent negotiation 
and adoption of the International Treaty. 
Mirroring this development at the 
international level, a number of countries, 
such as Uganda, have or are engaged in 
closely related, but nevertheless distinct, 
processes of developing policies for 
PGRFA and for genetic resources more 
generally. Since both the CBD and the 
International Treaty are going to be 
almost universal in acceptance, it will 
be necessary for all countries to consider 
this issue. Most ABS regimes developed 
to date have recognized a division 
between the academic and commercial 
sectors as users of genetic resources. 
The Seychelles government is currently 
considering a national ABS law that 
has four different categories of genetic 
resource identified—all of which require 
individual component objectives.
The second question that should 
be considered in the development 
of component objectives involves 
‘double checking’ tentatively identified 
component objectives against the 
overall purpose. This involves analyzing 
whether all of the elements of the overall 
purpose have in fact been reflected 
in greater detail in the component 
objectives. If not, perhaps they have 
simply been overlooked, and should 
be further developed. Alternatively, 
this is possibly a sign that at least some 
elements of the overall purpose are not 
practical enough to be reflected in more 
specific language; in short, these are 
rogue elements of the overall purpose 
that have been included more because 
of their rhetorical or political appeal 
than their potential guidance for what 
the instrument is meant to do. If such is 
the case, despite the rhetorical appeal of 
those elements, they should be dropped 
from the overall purpose. They will 
only add confusion—and possibly build 
unrealistic expectations—in the longer 
term.
Having undertaken this analysis, 
one should then reverse the process 
and review the identified component 
objectives in terms of the overall 
purpose. The basic things to ask here are 
whether there are identified component 
objectives that do not fit comfortably with 
at least one element of the purpose, or 
whether there are additional component 
objectives that you would like to 
introduce but that do not appear readily 
to fit into the proposed purpose. If the 
answer to either of these is ‘yes’, then a 
return to step 1 and a further review of 
the overall purpose is warranted.
Information check:
Do your component objectives match the full scope of your purpose? If not, are there additional 
component objectives that might be considered?
Have you developed component objectives that are beyond the original scope? If so, should the 
original purpose be revisited?
Have you considered the interests of the various sectors and stakeholder groups that may have an 
interest in, or be affected by, ABS systems, including environment, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, 
health, science and technology, private sector (e.g. pharmaceuticals, pesticides, agrobiotech, 
industrial chemicals), and indigenous and local communities?
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Step 3. Baseline information
Baseline information refers quite simply 
to the on-the-ground social, cultural, 
economic, scientific, political and legal data 
and information that provide a basis for 
informed decision-making in a particular 
community, country or region. It is the 
qualitative and quantitative information 
that, in the ideal scenario, should form 
the basis for a government’s decision to 
venture into the process of developing 
an ABS regime in the first place. As a fall-
back position, information gathering and 
analysis is an integral component of refining 
the overall purpose and its component 
objectives (and subsequent steps in the 
development of ABS legislation) once a 
team has received its marching orders 
from higher political levels to develop a 
law. Baseline information should allow 
decision-makers to consider and define 
the overall goal or general purpose and 
the related component objectives of a 
policy or legislation in terms of specific 
mechanisms or actions that reflect the 
reality of the needs and interests country 
or region.
In many situations, because either 
data and information are not available in 
a processed form, or because they have 
never been collected, systematized and 
analyzed, the decision-making relies 
more on abstract political or ideological 
objectives than on scientific data. This has 
a direct bearing on the probable eventual 
effectiveness of policies and legislation, 
because purposes and objectives not 
founded on a situational analysis of the 
country or region, or where they exist in 
an abstract context, are likely to be, or to 
rapidly become, redundant. Analyzing 
existing information, and acquiring 
new baseline information where gaps 
exist, is probably the issue that that 
most clearly reflects the point made in 
the introduction that the steps presented 
in this document are not necessarily 
sequential. Almost all of the steps require 
some form of information gathering to 
be fully effective. In addition, although 
the process and methodology of 
identifying the purpose and setting 
component objectives may vary among 
communities, countries and regions (i.e. 
Example: Seychelles 
Primary objectives:
Identify and assess knowledge of available resources; ensure use is within yield potentials; promote 
foreign access; promote domestic use and development; restrict irregular or unmonitored access 
within cost and capacity limitations; enhance domestic capacity for use; ensure domestic access 
to agricultural resources; maximize overall potential of benefit-sharing options; promote inter-state 
collaboration; develop, enrich and promote implementation of CBD and the International Treaty.
Component objectives:
Marine—Increase knowledge; regulate and monitor; guarantee minimum rights; promote and 
monitor access; identify (taxonomy and passport data); ensure financial benefit sharing only in the 
event of commercialization.
Agricultural—Facilitate access to exotic germplasm; develop local collections; promote access 
to foreign resources by Seychelles (user measures?); promote development and use of local 
collections.
Endemic terrestrial—Strictly regulate access and use; generate revenue; maximize protection; 
control access; maximize benefit sharing; promote academic and commercial research.
Non-endemic terrestrial—Promote use to generate benefits through volume; promote research 
and access, and in general maximize benefit sharing on a volume basis.
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some may decide to set a policy goal and 
objectives a priori, and then assess the 
available baseline information; others 
may decide to undertake a baseline 
information analysis prior to defining 
a policy goal and objective), the process 
of gathering and considering baseline 
information remains critical.
Part of the information gathering 
process may be served by established 
methods of analysis, such as 
PEST (political, economic, social, 
technological)8. However, PEST analysis, 
focusing on the general nature of 
environments in which one intends to 
operate, is usually accompanied by two 
further steps. One is an analysis of relevant 
environments and, in the current context, 
this means the collection of information 
directly relating to the elaboration and 
assessment of component objectives. 
The second step is an internal analysis 
of the levels of political will, institutional 
capacity, and possible budgetary support. 
Furthermore, understanding the past, 
present and likely future patterns of 
the local supply of genetic resources 
to domestic and foreign users, and 
conversely the domestic consumption 
of foreign genetic resources is critical. 
Experience suggests that these patterns 
of the exchange of genetic resources 
vary significantly between sectors and, 
often, between actors within a given 
sector. If one seeks to create a supportive 
environment for continued and higher 
levels of exchanges, it is probable that 
the objective and constituent elements 
of the legislation will differ from those 
aimed at prohibiting existing patterns 
of access or supply. In terms of internal 
analysis, it is useful to have a reasonable 
idea of the capacity of the country to 
make use of the technologies associated 
with access, and potential products. For 
example, the technologies associated 
with some aspects of industrial enzyme 
development probably will not be of more 
than marginal benefit to many developing 
countries, and the products are unlikely 
to have any fundamental economic or 
social significance. In contrast, many of 
the products of agricultural research, 
particularly where this research targets 
a developing country context, can be 
immensely beneficial. As clear as these 
examples might seem, one should exercise 
caution in making any generalizations. 
Cutting-edge biotechnology approaches 
in pharmaceutical development could 
lead to solutions for severe threats, such as 
HIV/AIDS or malaria, and developments 
with enzymes have significant potential 
for environmental protection, while many 
innovations in agricultural research may 
only be relevant to large-scale, high-input 
farming and therefore not a high priority 
for smallholder-dominated agricultural 
economies.
As stated earlier, the purpose and 
objectives of the legislation will turn 
on existing information about ongoing 
patterns of supply and uses of genetic 
resources, and the probability that a policy 
intervention in the form of a tailored ABS 
law will produce the desired readjustment 
of behaviour. At the same time, the kind 
of information that might be required, or 
that might be useful, may also depend 
upon the component objectives that 
have been identified. For example, issues 
relating to the nature and volume of 
activity can be perceived quite differently 
depending upon whether one is asking in 
the context of seeking to limit or control 
irregular access, or as a means of targeting 
scientific fields for domestic development. 
To determine what information should 
be sought, one can begin by considering 
each component objective in the light of 
questions such as:
•	 What sorts of activities are likely to 
be associated with the component 
objective? In this context, it is important 
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to consider the country’s situation both 
as a provider and as a user of genetic 
resources.
•	 What types of genetic resources do the 
activities relating to the component 
objective affect or involve?
•	 To what degree are likely activities, 
by their nature, directly or indirectly 
beneficial or prejudicial at local, 
national, regional or international 
levels?
•	 What sorts of actors have, or may in 
the future have, an interest in likely 
activities?
•	 What sorts of technologies are 
associated with likely activities and to 
what degree do these exist or constitute 
a national priority in the country?
•	 What is the relative level of endemism 
of the genetic resources involved, and 
are there other potential sources for 
the same or similar material?
•	 Where are the types of genetic resource 
likely to be of interest most commonly 
found in geographical and legal terms, 
e.g. protected areas, public land, 
private land?
Ultimately, it is not really possible 
to predict all the specific questions one 
might need to ask as their nature and 
relative significance will vary on a case-
by-case basis. However, one should be 
sure to think in terms of what information 
might be needed to make a reasonably 
informed decision as to how to proceed 
with a given component objective.
Information gathering can be as 
simple or as complex a task as the 
available resources and time allow. As 
much as the absence of an information 
gathering process may prejudice future 
outcomes, it must also be recognized 
that there is probably a point at which 
further information gathering would 
produce proportionately fewer returns in 
substantive inputs, a fact that needs to be 
respected given that most policy-makers 
do not have the time or financial resources 
to dedicate to digging up exhaustive 
data sets. A more thorough information 
gathering process usually pays dividends, 
but where this is not possible, a shorter, 
more ad hoc, approach could provide 
a minimum that might be acceptable. 
Even such a minimalist approach should, 
however, include contacts with relevant 
national and international agencies, as 
well as with NGOs and, where possible, 
private-sector actors representing 
different genetic resources interests. 
These contacts do not necessarily have to 
be in the form of workshops but could be 
based on smaller meetings or interviews. 
Where this is not possible, the views of 
different organizations can sometimes 
be discerned from their Web sites. This 
direct contact should be supplemented 
with some form of literature review that 
includes consideration of the content of 
debate in forums such as the WIPO Inter-
Governmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC)9, the CBD Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit 
Sharing10 and the FAO Commission 
on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture.11 In addition to simple 
information about their activities, the 
Web pages of these forums also generally 
provide quite extensive background 
information in the form of technical 
papers and reports.
Wherever possible, it is recommended 
to have a range of professional disciplines 
involved in the collection and review of 
information. The broader perspectives 
can be valuable, as can the fact that a 
multi-disciplinary team will be probably 
have a wider range of contacts and be 
aware of a wider range of activities and 
information sources.
There are two final points regarding 
information gathering.
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First, one should be aware of the 
possible time frames associated with 
policy-making processes. Awareness of the 
time frames associated with the different 
options influences how much information 
gathering is possible. The following 
estimates are not written in stone, but they 
approximate to those commonly used as 
rules of thumb in legal drafting.
•	 In the case of a simple policy statement, 
one should be aiming at a period of 
relevance of at least five years, given 
that such an instrument is a statement 
of intention more than a binding 
commitment and can be relatively 
easily amended or superseded should 
the need arise. This means that a 
policy statement can be largely based 
upon an understanding of current 
and historical dynamics in the field, 
with only limited concern for future 
developments, which can be reacted 
to as and when they arise.
•	 Where a more formally adopted policy 
statement or subsidiary regulations 
are under consideration, the relevant 
time frame for relevance should be 
extended to at least 10 or 15 years. This 
type of instrument is, depending upon 
the prevailing political circumstances, 
somewhat more difficult to amend 
than a simple policy statement and is 
more binding upon those it regulates, 
with consequently greater impacts.
•	 If the outcome of the policy process is 
primary legislation, then a time frame 
of at least 25 years is most appropriate. 
Legislative instruments are, almost 
universally, complex things to amend 
or repeal and have the most definitive 
impacts of all the possible options. 
ABS, because of the rapidly evolving 
technologies of the life sciences 
associated with it, is dynamic and 
therefore any legislative instrument 
should be based on a sufficiently sound 
understanding of current trends and 
patterns to allow for their reasonable 
extrapolation into future expectations.
Another point is that information-
gathering activities should not only 
inform the policy-making process but 
also provide a framework for some of the 
outcomes of that process, particularly 
where one is considering legislation or 
subsidiary regulations. Some means of 
monitoring and analyzing the nature 
and volumes of activity, patterns of 
applications and values, and similar 
evolving activities will probably be a 
fundamental element in any long-term 
framework, as a basis for its being able 
to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Such monitoring and analysis requires 
a mechanism that can link different 
agencies and interested parties, and will 
not be effective unless it is supported 
by sufficient human resources to allow 
proper interpretation and application.
By this point, at the end of step 3, the 
overall purpose and component objectives 
of the ABS legislation should be clearly 
stated and their underlying rationale well 
understood. These are probably the most 
critical elements of this methodology, and 
the more time devoted to them, the better. 
If things are not completely clear, or 
members of the working group involved 
are not comfortable with the conclusions 
reached12, then it is wiser to go back and 
review the issues in question, rather than 
proceed.
It is useful to note that the thought 
processes underlying, and decisions 
made in, step 2 can provide the bulk of 
information required for a basic policy 
statement on access to genetic resources, 
whether this is intended as a stand-
alone document or as a supporting 
explanation of what is intended in the 
implementation of another instrument.
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Possible objectives† Type of baseline information required 
Prevent depletion and erosion 
of genetic diversity
Where is genetic diversity geographically most concentrated in the 
country or region, and what are the main activities (who are the key 
actors?) affecting or influencing these areas?
How valuable are genetic resources in these areas?
What are the underlying factors for undertaking activities affecting 
genetic resources (economic reasons, social pressure, perverse 
incentives (what type?), limited awareness of value of genetic 
diversity and biodiversity in general, tradition)?
How will regulating access to, and benefit sharing concerning, the 
target resources affect their depletion?
Facilitate income-generating 
projects based on genetic 
resources
What types of genetic resources are found in the country (and 
within the region) and what are they used for?
Who (institutions, scientists, entrepreneurs) are engaged in projects 
making direct and indirect use of genetic resources in the country?
What is the commercial demand for genetic resources from the 
country or region?
What are the predicted financial benefits to be gained through the 
operation of the ABS legislation? 
Prevent genetic erosion in local 
and native varieties 
What genetic resources are reflected in local and national 
consumption patterns?
What are the main causes for genetic erosion of local and native 
varieties?
What type of incentives (fiscal, administrative, economic?) do 
small-scale farmers (especially those who conserve diversity) have 
to conserve and market local and native varieties?
What is the level of awareness among the public, decision-makers, 
etc., about the social, cultural and economic importance of local 
and native farmer varieties?
What are the most threatened varieties and where are these threats 
most acute?
What are the threats?
How will regulating access to and benefit sharing concerning the 
target resources affect their depletion?
Ensure access to a broad 
diversity of genetic resources 
for breeding crops of national 
importance for food security
What type of R&D is being undertaken in the country (region) with 
regard to genetic resources? How dependent is that research on 
genetic resources located within the country concerned? In other 
countries?
What are the main legal and administrative burdens that might 
affect possible access to genetic resources of importance for food 
and agriculture or other uses?
Notes: † Either complete in themselves, or objective components as elements in the more general 
purpose, goals or objectives.
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Part II: Identifying the basic 
framework
This Part focuses on identifying the 
changes that any ABS law needs to 
be able to effect in order to achieve its 
purpose and component objectives. 
This exercise is divided into three 
steps, being steps 4, 5 and 6 of the 
overall process. Step 4 consists of 
identifying the prerequisite institutional 
capacities and behaviours of people at 
community, national or regional levels 
that are necessary for the purpose and 
component objectives to be realized. 
These capacities and behaviours are 
referred to as ‘prerequisite conditions,’ or 
‘preconditions’ throughout this section 
of the text. Step 5 consists of identifying 
existing gaps between the preconditions 
(or ideal state of affairs) identified in step 
4 and the actual situation on-the-ground 
in the community, country or region 
concerned. Step 6 involves analysis of:
•	 the elements of policy or legal 
interventions that would be necessary 
to close the gaps identified (to create or 
promote the prerequisite conditions);
•	 whether those interventions can be 
reasonably included within ABS laws; 
and
•	 whether there is a reasonable chance, 
given the resources available within 
the community, country or region, for 
those interventions to succeed.
Step 4. Institutional 
capacities and human 
behaviours that are 
prerequisite conditions 
for achieving component 
objectives
Once a set of component objectives has 
been established one should look to 
identify the preconditions that need to 
be in place to achieve those component 
objectives. The following two examples 
illustrate, in a simplified manner, the link 
between purpose, component objectives 
and necessary preconditions.
Example 1. Preventing erosion of 
diversity in forest genetic resources
The component objective of preventing 
the depletion of the diversity of genetic 
resources is one possible element of 
the overall purpose to conserve and 
sustainably use biodiversity. Assume 
that, in a given country, an assessment 
of baseline information reveals that the 
major threats to the national diversity of 
genetic resources are the loss of forests due 
to land conversion, and unsustainable 
extraction of medicinal plants for local 
use. However, also assume that forest 
genetic resources provide options for 
income diversification among forest-
adjacent communities and that medicinal 
plants are a major source of primary 
healthcare for the rural poor.
One way to prevent the loss of forests 
would be to limit land conversion. Another 
(potentially complementary) way would 
be to create incentives to conserve the forest 
by allowing local peoples to gain benefits 
(e.g. money, technology transfer, inclusion 
in research projects, training) in return 
for supplying genetic resources gathered 
from the forest. Income diversification 
options that forest genetic resources offer 
can be both a threat, through stimulating 
unsustainable extraction, and an oppor-
tunity, in terms of demonstrating the value 
of forest conservation to the neighbouring 
communities that may constitute the most 
likely source of both threat—through their 
overuse of the resource and conversion 
of the land to other purposes—and 
opportunity—through gaining benefits 
from the supply of resources and sharing 
their associated specialized knowledge 
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about those resources. This would suggest 
that some form of managed access to 
forests, or to forest genetic resources, and 
possibly the traditional knowledge of 
local peoples concerning those resources, 
might be a pragmatic alternative to 
simply banning land conversion through 
legislation.
Just as strictly banning conversion of 
forest land is probably the most direct 
means of preserving forests, so the most 
obvious means of stemming a decline 
in medicinal plant populations is to 
simply limit access to those populations 
and absolutely prohibit their collection 
and use. As a sole approach however, 
this may not be terribly effective, as 
preventing access to a resource that is 
considered a necessity is likely to be met 
by efforts to circumvent or ignore the 
prohibition and could require policing 
resources that are not available. A less 
restrictive limitation that facilitates a 
minimum level of access has a far higher 
chance of success, combined with efforts 
to boost awareness of conservation 
imperatives and to boost supply through 
socially acceptable alternatives, such as 
inventorying to define the resource size 
and biologically sustainable exploitation 
level, and the establishment of nurseries 
to provide alternative supplies. Thus 
one precondition for the success of the 
objective of preventing depletion of 
the genetic diversity of the population 
would be that systems are in place to 
control access for limited harvesting of 
the resources, in particular areas, for 
particular uses and by particular users. 
These limitations could be adjusted in 
response to changes in the level of threat 
of genetic erosion of the resource in 
question. Another precondition would 
be that local peoples are able to gain 
benefits—monetary or otherwise—
through sustainable harvest and supply 
of genetic resources.
Example 2. Gaining access to plant 
genetic resources for food and 
agriculture
The component objective of accessing 
a broad diversity of genetic resources 
for key crops is a possible element in 
the overall purposes of promoting food 
security and agricultural research. The 
assumed baseline parameter is that the 
breeding programme of the country in 
question makes signicant use of crop 
germplasm from international collections 
and other countries. The country also has 
minimal locally available diversity to 
support its research priorities. One fairly 
clear precondition for the realization 
of the component objective would be 
facilitated access to exotic germplasm.
Preconditions should be identified 
from consideration of component objec-
tives, in the context of relevant baseline 
information. This helps identify those 
precondition of direct relevance.
When conducting this exercise 
in practise, the range of possible 
preconditions will be far greater than those 
presented here, reflecting the diversity 
inherent in the real-world situation and 
the range of different purposes and 
objectives of ABS law. Going through this 
step, it is likely that some preconditions 
will be identified that relate to more than 
one component objective. This outcome 
is fine; in fact, it indicates that those 
objectives in particular are ‘in synch’ with 
one another and that they can probably 
both be advanced simultaneously through 
the same form of policy intervention 
(a subject discussed in subsequent 
steps). Going through this step, it is 
important to maintain a direct line of 
causal connection between the requisite 
preconditions, the overall purpose and 
the component objectives. Approaching 
the identification of preconditions as an 
abstract exercise, or in relationship to 
the totality of the component objectives, 
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is likely to undermine the logic that the 
methodology is intended to promote, 
and thereby undermine its ultimate 
effectiveness.
Step 5. Gap analysis: 
which preconditions are 
unmet?
Step 5 consists of assessing the current 
true status of the institutional capacities 
and human behaviours that have already 
been identified as preconditions for the 
realization of the overall purpose and 
objectives. The output from this step 
should be a list of currently unrealized 
or unmet preconditions, or put another 
way, the gaps between the ideal state of 
affairs wherein the objectives of the law 
could be realized and the reality of the 
situation on the ground in the countries 
concerned.
Step 5 is a natural extension of step 
3, in that it consists of information 
gathering. However, here the need is to 
assess the current status of an identified 
precondition. Unlike the somewhat 
broad scope of investigation that is 
required in step 3, the need here is for 
research that specifically focuses on 
the institutional capacities and human 
behaviours that have already been 
identified as preconditions.
Qualitative information can be 
as important as quantitative in this 
instance. This means that while 
clear pieces of information that can 
be objectively assessed, such as the 
existence or otherwise of relevant 
legislation, should be used as a starting 
point, more qualitative information, such 
Examples
Possible component 
objective Baseline Information Possible preconditions
Prevent depletion of 
diversity of genetic 
resources.
Level of threat to forest diversity 
as a result of land conversion 
Limited land conversion 
Forest genetic resources 
present an option for income 
diversification 
Managed access to forests or to 
forest genetic resources 
Medicinal plant populations 
declining due to unsustainable 
local use
Limited access to, use of, 
medicinal plants
Rural communities are 
significantly dependant on 
medicinal plants for primary 
healthcare
Inventories and conservation 
programmes for medicinal plants
Facilitate access to a 
broad diversity of genetic 
resources for key crops
Extent and significance of inflows 
and outflows of germplasm of 
different varieties and species in 
support of breeding programmes
Facilitated access to foreign 
germlplasm
Extent of local collection and 
conservation
Key crops listed in Annex I, FAO 
Treaty
Being a member country of the 
International Treaty, able to take 
advantage of the Multilateral 
System of Access and Benefit-
sharing it creates
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as the levels of their implementation 
or effectiveness should be actively 
sought. Qualitative data of this nature 
is is particularly critical, as it assists 
analyists to distinguish between theory 
and practice; it is however, data most 
overlooked in the field. This is partly 
because it is usually more difficult to 
collect than quantitative data, influenced 
as it may be by the beliefs and opinions 
of the individuals providing and 
analyzing it.
Step 6. Policy interventions 
to achieve change
Elements of potential policy or legal 
interventions
Having determined what gaps exist and 
need to be filled in Step 5, attention in 
Step 6 turns to an analysis of policy and 
legal interventions available for filling 
them. The identification of options 
for achieving change should be firmly 
rooted in reality. The ongoing gathering 
and synthesis of community-, country- 
or region-specific information clearly 
plays an important role in this step.
Where a particular means of 
achieving a change seems immediately 
apparent, an effort should be made to 
identify alternatives, as, even where 
these are ultimately rejected, they 
can prove useful for comparing and 
contrasting, and their consideration 
will generally inform decision-making. 
In common with most, if not all, policy 
and regulatory frameworks, one 
should consider both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ 
options. Just as, at its strongest, the 
law establishes offences and penalties 
as a means of discouraging activities, 
it also creates incentives where 
appropriate for what is understood as 
‘correct behaviour’. ABS laws should 
combine both approaches. Preventing 
irregular access is an objective of many 
ABS laws; at the same time, ABS laws 
may also try to preserve or promote 
access. Concern about enforcing 
benefit sharing should not obscure the 
underlying fact that, access is required 
for benefits to be generated. Therefore, 
the aim is to encourage those who might 
engage in irregular access to move to 
an accepted, regularized process that 
incorporates benefit-sharing measures. 
This will require penalties to raise the 
risks associated with irregular activity, 
at the same time as the creation of 
a system for regular access that is 
sufficiently easy to render unattractive 
the taking of the risk associated with 
non-compliance.13
Again, it is impossible here to 
consider all of the elements that could 
be included in an ABS law to create or 
promote the prerequisite conditions 
for the realization of the objectives and 
purposes identified in the previous 
steps. However, a few such elements are 
discussed in the examples below.
Can the interventions identified 
reasonably be included within 
ABS policies or legislation?
Once a range of options for achieving 
change has been laid out, two further 
issues must be considered. The first issue, 
addressed in this subsection, is whether 
the changes that need to be made can be 
reasonably addressed within the context 
of an ABS policy or law.
The second issue, considered below, 
follows from the first: if indeed the change 
is one that can be reasonably included in 
an ABS law, are there resources available 
within the country concerned to actually 
implement the law or policy. A common 
problem that has undermined a number 
of ABS regimes is that efforts have been 
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made to ‘bend’ such regimes to address 
issues that do not fall within its natural 
scope, such as problems associated 
with enforcement of protected areas 
regulation or natural resources extraction. 
Ineffective enforcement of protected 
areas should be addressed directly, rather 
than by using ABS as a proxy. Similarly, 
an inability to capture what are perceived 
as equitable, or indeed any, benefits from 
natural resource extraction often leads 
to efforts to restore balance through ABS 
mechanisms.14
In discussion of step 4 above, there 
was discussion that the best means of 
preventing erosion of forest genetic 
resources would be to prevent the 
conversion of forest lands to alternative 
uses. This kind of legal intervention, for 




If, in fact, the intervention considered 
could be included in any access 
legislation, it is equally important to 
assess whether there is any chance of 
actually achieving the change desired, 
given the resources available, history 
of cooperation between the constituent 
groups affected by the legislation, the 
enforcement agencies, and so forth.
Examples of elements of potential policy or legal interventions
Possible preconditions Gap analysis
Elements of potential 
interventions
Limited land conversion No clear demarcation of land use 
status
No effective limitation on excision 
of forests land
Existing rules frequently ignored 
Scheduling or zoning of land uses
Enhanced protection of forest land
Enhanced enforcement and 
penalties for irregular conversion
Managed access to 
forests or to forest 
genetic resources 
Access to forests either 
unrestricted or prohibited 
Introduction of permitting system 
allowing limited access for 
individuals or groups for stated 
purposes 
Limited access to or use 
of medicinal plants
No system of enhancing 
availability of popular plants to 
relieve stress on wild populations
Amend mandates of relevant lead 






Currently absent or fragmented 
among diverse agencies
Amend mandates of relevant 
agencies to promote activity or to 
establish coordination of efforts
Facilitated access to 
foreign germplasm
Absence of agreements to 
support regional or international 
exchange of germplasm other 
than case by case
Create structure for establishment 
or membership of crop networks
Promote regional cooperation 
in germplasm conservation and 
research
Ratify and implement International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture to 
guarantee access at international 
level
 Part II: Identfyng the basc framework
This process of assessment can 
be complex, particularly as some of 
the criteria against which a potential 
intervention needs to be assessed 
would be community, country or region 
specific. Other criteria may be relatively 
common across a range of countries, 
although their relative significance 
may vary according to circumstances. 
For example, different countries are 
likely to have different levels available 
of technical skills, financial resources, 
scientific infrastructure or enforcement 
capacity, even though these factors 
are likely to be relevant in all cases. In 
identifying criteria against which the 
potential success of an element might be 
assessed, one should try to consider all 
of the local factors that might determine 
whether that option will succeed or 
fail in the particular context. One 
should, of course, try to think of the 
advantages that options may present, 
but particular effort should be made 
to identify disadvantages. There is a 
natural tendency to favour particular 
options, for reasons that are as varied as 
the options themselves, and the easiest 
way to neutralize this tendency is to 
adopt a consciously critical approach to 
all options.
As much as the process of assessment 
may be complex and the criteria of 
assessment often case specific, some 
criteria are fundamental and will exist 
to varying degrees in all situations. Such 
basic criteria likely to be relevant to the 
assessment of options include:
•	 What is the cost of implementing 
each particular element of the regime, 
and of the regime as a whole? What 
human resources would be required 
to implement (and enforce) the 
regime? How much of a challenge is it 
Examples of relevance of elements to ABS
Elements of potential interventions Relevance to ABS
Scheduling or zoning of land uses
Enhanced protection of forest land
Enhanced enforcement and penalties for 
irregular conversion
No relevance—land or planning law
No relevance—forest law
No relevance—land, planning or forest law, or, 
perhaps, general penal code
Introduction of permitting system allowing 
limited access for individuals or groups for 
stated purposes 
Potential element of an ABS regime—an ABS 
policy might either allow for or limit such a 
system or could even be used to establish it.
Amend mandates of relevant lead agencies to 
include propagation of medicinal plants
No relevance—addressed in parent legislation 
of agencies, although aspects of benefit-sharing 
policy in an ABS policy could be directed to 
support this role
Amend mandates of relevant agencies to 
promote activity or to establish coordination of 
efforts
No relevance—addressed in parent legislation 
of agencies, although aspects of benefit-sharing 
policy in an ABS policy could be directed to 
support this role
Create structure for establishment or 
membership of crop networks
Promote regional cooperation in germplasm 
conservation and research
Ratify and implement International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture to guarantee access at international 
level
Possible element of ABS regime—should, at 
least, be allowed for by ABS regime
Possible element of ABS regime—could be 
promoted by ABS regime by providing for 
recognition
Possible element of ABS regime—implementing 
measures for ITPGRFA could be incorporated 
with broader ABS measures
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to monitor people potentially leaving 
the country with genetic resources 
that they do not have the right to 
access? Are there resources to support 
the necessary presence of border 
enforcement to ensure acceptable 
levels of overall compliance?
•	 Will local people cooperate con-
structively with government on 
implementing the policy or law?
•	 Is the approach of the law or policy 
consistent with the prevailing customs 
and beliefs of the people most 
affected by it, and of those expected to 
participate in its implementation?
•	 Is there a commercial market (locally, 
nationally or globally) for the genetic 
resources within the community, 
country or region to which the 
legislation restricts or prohibits access? 
Could the funds raised underwrite the 
costs of effectively implementing the 
law?
•	 Are the genetic resources most 
threatened by erosion useful in any 
way to local people?
•	 Do the benefits to be obtained through 
the operation of the legislation outweigh 
the costs of its implementation?
•	 What are the likely impacts on and 
interests of different stakeholders and 
sectors? This relates closely to and will 
probably significantly overlap with 
questions of risks and benefits.
•	 Does the legislation create any 
inadvertent, so-called perverse, 
incentives for people to engage in 
behaviours with a negative impact?
•	 What form of intervention would be 
required? Some options may only 
require a policy statement or the 
publication of guidelines, whereas 
others, particularly where the 
establishment of penalties is involved, 
will require more robust legal force. As 
a general principle, the lowest level of 
legal force necessary for the purpose 
should be adopted. (The issue of what 
form of policy instrument is considered 
again in Part III below.)
The ultimate aim of the critical 
assessment is to divide the options 
for achieving change into the rough 
categories of yes, no or possibly. Those 
that are clearly viable, and those that 
might be, can be carried forward, while 
those that are clearly unacceptable can 
be rejected after review.
Where it appears that options are 
unacceptable, it is advisable to revisit 
the component objective and consider 
whether it can still be considered either 
valid or achievable. If it can, one should 
repeat steps 4, 5 and 6 to determine if 
an alternative, more acceptable, set of 
options for change can be developed. If 
it appears that no acceptable alternative 
options are available, and the component 
objective in question is fundamental to 
the fulfilment of the overall purpose, it 
may be necessary to go all the way back to 
step 1 and reconsider the overall purpose 
itself. While this may involve costs in 
terms of time and resources, the effort 
should not be considered wasted, as the 
development and analysis of different 
options, even if subsequently rejected, 
usually increases understanding of the 
dynamics impinging on options that 
may ultimately be adopted.
Step 7. Reconciliation and 
prioritization of options for 
change
At the end of step 6, one should be left 
with a series of sets of options for potential 
policy and or legal interventions that have 
been determined as being both practical 
and politically feasible. However, at this 
point, these options are isolated and 
parallel, rather than coordinated into 
the larger overall strategy required for 
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an effective law or policy. Step 7 seeks to 
address this situation by focusing on the 
relationships among options for change, 
both individually and collectively.
The first element in this step is to 
re-group the options remaining at 
the end of step 6 according to their 
role or function, (as opposed to the 
earlier groupings based on component 
objectives). The basic types of role 
or function are relatively common to 
policies or law in any sector, e.g. to create 
rights or obligations with the intention 
of restricting or promoting particular 
behaviours, and to provide processes 
for the administration and regulation 
of those rights, responsibilities and 
behaviours. The most fundamental 
functional groupings are considered 
below.
Restrictive measures
In the case of access to genetic resources, 
restrictions usually exist in the form of 
requirements that specified activities 
be licensed or permitted according 
to some combination of fixed and 
variable terms and conditions. The most 
restrictive regimes tend to emphasize 
variable conditions that are the subject 
of negotiations between applicants for 
access and multiple actors with defined 
roles as providers. Such regimes tend to 
be the most restrictive for two reasons. 
First, the transaction costs involved with 
such complex negotiations are generally 
high, particularly because of the often 
varying situations of the different actors, 
which requires significant effort to 
accommodate. Second, the involvement 
of these different actors is usually 
motivated by the potential to capture 
benefits, thereby multiplying the cost of 
terms and conditions.
The fact that high transaction and 
agreement costs increase the incentives 
for avoidance or evasion of the system 
often leads to more restrictive approaches 
to the eligibility of applicants, the 
application process, terms and conditions 
and the monitoring and enforcement 
of those terms and conditions. This 
scenario is frequently exacerbated by the 
fact that access to genetic resources often 
involves transboundary transactions 
and asymmetrical relationships in terms 
of information and economic influence.
Less restrictive regimes generally 
follow one of two basic patterns.
One is to leave the entire process in 
private hands, usually allowing access 
negotiations to regard those holding 
tenure of land as the providers of 
the resources found on that land and 
subjecting the relationship to the standard 
provisions of contract law. Such an 
approach is likely to favour the interests 
of those seeking access, due to the fact 
that the bargaining power of individual 
holders of tenure is limited. As such, 
it is most commonly adopted, usually 
as some form of policy statement, in 
relatively developed countries, where the 
value of research and commercialization 
is placed above that of the value of the 
raw materials that support that research 
and commercialization. Another feature 
of this approach is that what transaction 
costs there are largely accrue directly to 
the parties, with the remainder being 
borne by the judicial system in the event 
of a dispute.
The second common pattern among 
less restrictive regimes is the use of 
largely standard terms and conditions 
and focal points for the granting of 
access. Such an approach depends upon 
a collective approach to negotiations, 
usually through a government-
established administrative mechanism. 
It has the advantage of mitigating 
asymmetries in relationships and, 
potentially, of maximizing the value of 
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genetic resources, whether by enhancing 
bargaining power or, more often, by 
limiting transaction costs and the range 
of actors involved in benefit sharing.
Promotional measures
The promotion of activities in the 
context of ABS generally mirrors the 
restrictive aspects of regimes, in that the 
provision of a simple and predictable 
framework, that allows for reasonable 
calculations of risk, is the most common 
and effective incentive. Other efforts 
at promotion usually revolve around 
questions of capacity and infrastructure, 
with the case of InBio in Costa Rica 
being perhaps the best known example. 
InBio has used ABS as an opportunity to 
develop its scientific capacity and this 
capacity has, in turn, probably acted as 
an attractant for further access requests 
due to the quality of local partnership 
and assistance.
Terms and conditions
The above discussion of restrictive 
and promotional elements touches 
on a number of the other themes or 
functions that should be considered. The 
methodology should produce at least 
some specific terms and conditions to 
be attached to the grant of access. These 
terms and conditions may be a ‘pre-
packaged group’, such as those developed 
under the International Treaty, or may 
be more varied, having been developed 
for the specific case in question in other 
sectors. The two main areas that should 
be considered in the context of terms 
and conditions are those that relate 
to the monitoring and enforcement of 
terms and conditions, and those that 
relate to benefit sharing. The former 
tend to be relatively precise while, in the 
most effective regimes, the latter tend to 
be more flexible, highlighting principles 
and desired strategies rather than fixed 
requirements, although combinations 
of basic administrative fees with other 
more flexible options are common.
Administrative measures
Options for change that relate to 
administrative processes and structures 
can play a critical role in the relative 
efficiency of a framework and should be 
carefully considered. Clarity and trans-
parency are the main considerations, 
but concentrating capacity and decision-
making can also be advantageous. At a 
more practical level, budgetary issues 
can be a determining factor. Complex 
systems requiring detailed negotiation 
and subsequent monitoring and 
enforcement will need skilled human 
resources and significant funding for 
implementation. This highlights the 
fact that, in identifying administrative 
options, one should consider both 
process- and capacity-related issues.
Monitoring and enforcement
Questions of enforcement are funda-
mental to most legislative regimes and 
are also a consideration in other policy 
frameworks. Enforcement is commonly 
understood as relating to offences 
and penalties, but, in practice, can be 
significantly broader, with offences and 
penalties only representing the strongest 
possible measures in the spectrum. In 
identifying options for change, other 
means of enforcement, in addition to 
the general pattern of incentives and 
risks discussed above, should have been 
identified. These will probably relate 
to monitoring, but could also relate to 
other areas, such as benefit sharing, 
where the establishment of a framework 
that encourages cooperation can be as, 
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or even more, effective in enforcement 
than nominally stronger measures. 
Somewhere in between these very hard 
and soft options lies the consideration of 
alternative dispute resolution, whether 
consisting of some form of mediation 
or arbitration, or both. The introduction 
of such mechanisms can be particularly 
useful because of the international 
character of many access to genetic 
resources relationships, where recourse 
to judicial systems can be expensive or 
impractical, and may also help in the 
maintenance of relationships.
Information
The issue of information is a less obvious 
category than the others mentioned 
here, but is probably one of the most 
important, and certainly constantly 
relevant. Even in a regime that is based 
on private transactions, the availability of 
information is a critical factor. As noted 
earlier, the step of gathering baseline 
information is not only an ongoing 
process throughout this methodology 
but also something that may need to be 
built into the operational structure of 
any regime.
Prioritization
The categories considered may well 
interconnect on various levels. However, 
having precisely defined, mutually 
exclusive categories is not necessary, 
provided that there is sufficient 
coherence for the purposes of analysis. 
The basis of this analysis is to consider 
the relationships both within and 
between groups, including both their 
positive and negative aspects.
The purpose is to identify oppor-
tunities to rationalize the number 
of options remaining by merging 
them wherever possible. One should 
therefore be looking for options that 
are of a complementary or otherwise 
compatible nature or that may involve 
similar powers. Consolidating them to 
the degree possible will still serve the 
purpose of streamlining the pattern of 
options.
The basis for dealing with any 
contradictions or other incompatibilities 
should be the prioritization of options for 
change and the exploration of possible 
compromise solutions.
Prioritization facilitates the adoption 
or rejection of options, but also 
provides a focus for considering how 
to link the different options and where 
to concentrate efforts that involve 
significant resource demands. The 
prioritization exercise will again involve 
refering back to the component objectives 
and overall purpose that underlie the 
possible legal and policy interventions. 
It may be necessary to consider rejecting 
some options where these clearly conflict 
with others of a higher priority, but this 
should be considered as an extreme 
option. In the majority of cases it is more 
likely that some form of a compromise 
solution can be developed.
The most obvious of such compromise 
techniques in regimes developed to date 
is that of ‘segmenting’ the system in 
some manner. This is usually in terms 
of either using different approaches 
with different actors, such as academic 
versus commercial, or for different uses 
of resources, such as agricultural versus 
pharmaceutical or chemical. Distinctions 
can also be made on the basis of 
geography, such as resources found in 
marine versus terrestrial environments. 
The advantage of segmentation is that 
it allows for more- or less-restrictive 
or open approaches according to 
circumstances. One risk is that having 
entered into this segmentation approach, 
some areas will get left out inadvertently 
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as a result of not adequately defining 
the demarcations between different 
segments, thereby creating loopholes or 
ambiguous (‘grey’) areas. It is acceptable 
to decide not to include a category of 
resources in the scope of the law, on the 
basis that existing systems for addressing 
ABS with respect to those resources is 
adequate. However, that decision must 
be informed and deliberate, not the result 
of inadvertent oversight. One also needs 
to be certain that the basis for distinctions 
is well founded. For example, one of the 
factors that has undermined confidence 
in some systems using academic versus 
commercial distinctions is that this is 
based on the assumption that academic 
research produces public goods, whereas, 
increasingly, academic work may be 
undertaken in partnership with, or as a 
precursor to work by, commercial actors, 
and so does not become freely available 
in the public domain. Therefore, it is 
clear that a proper basis for an academic 
versus commercial distinction must 
look beyond the nominal identity of 
actors to consider also the nature of their 
proposed activities and ultimate end-
use of their research results.
The development and proliferation 
of national-level ABS law has been slow 
in the 13 years since the CBD came into 
force. At least part of the reason is that, 
from the outset, people have been overly 
optimistic about creating one-size-fits-
all national ABS law through which 
requests for access to all of the different 
types of a countries genetic resources for 
all kinds of uses could be filtered. The 
relatively recent coming into force of 
the International Treaty, which creates 
a Multilateral System of Access and 
Benefit-sharing for listed PGRFA for 
the purposes of research, training and 
conservation, underlines this point. 
For a portion—PGRFA—of the overall 
range of genetic resources in the world, 
it was possible to develop a specifically 
tailored ABS agreement that provided 
support for desirable, time tested 
patterns of exchange and use of those 
genetic resources. The even more recent 
adoption by the Governing Body of the 
Treaty of the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement to be used for all transfers of 
materials within the Treaty’s Multilateral 
System of Access and Benefit-sharing 
further illustrates the advantage of the 
world community considering the sui 
generis nature of different categories of 
genetic resources and their uses when 
considering appropriate terms and 
conditions for their regulation.
Once the process of internally 
reconciling options for change has 
been completed, the basic picture of the 
regime to be put in place will be sketched 
out. The objectives, mechanisms and 
general incentive patterns should be 
clear in terms of their detail, feasibility 
and justifications. There should also 
be coherence, both within the different 
objectives that the framework may 
embody and between the approaches 
adopted to achieve these objectives.
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Part III: Positioning and 
drafting
Having formulated the policy frame-
work, one’s focus should now turns to 
its realization. While Parts I and II above 
involved considerable participation and 
consultation of a broad range of technical 
experts and stakeholders, these final 
steps depend more exclusively on legal 
experts.
Step 8. External 
reconciliation of options for 
change
This step involves contextualizing the 
proposed framework in the existing 
legal and policy environment. This is 
something of a bridging step between 
the processes of policy formulation 
and that of its translation into a formal 
instrument in that it serves the dual 
purposes of deciding the final shape 
of the framework and of laying the 
foundations for its implementation. 
This is a direct continuation from step 
7 in that, where step 7 focused on the 
internal reconciliation of the proposed 
framework, this step focuses on its 
external reconciliation. The groups of 
options developed under step 7 should 
be examined for compatibility with 
other existing national laws and policies, 
and international obligations that the 
country may have under international 
agreements such as the CBD and the 
International Treaty that have not yet 
been implemented.
There should also be clear 
delimitation of the application of the 
framework, to distinguish it from other 
frameworks where alternative categories 
of nominally genetic resources are 
involved, such as for microorganisms, 
aquatic living organisms, species vital to 
national security, species listed in CITES 
appendixes, and deriving from other 
international agreements of relevance. 
In parallel, the ABS framework must be 
compatible with any relevant legislation 
or similar on biotechnology-related 
activities, such as attitudes to genetically 
modified organisms, and biosafety. Care 
must be taken to reconcile differences 
and harmonize similar elements so that 
the national codex of legislation has a 
consistent approach to similar elements 
appearing in different contexts.
One is primarily looking for conflicts 
and synergies. The options for addressing 
conflicts are limited as it will beyond the 
ability of the drafters of the ABS law 
to alter other existing laws. Therefore, 
this should only be proposed where it 
appears that the possibility of achieving 
a component objective is threatened and 
where that objective clearly appears to 
be a higher priority than that advanced 
by the conflicting law or policy. In such a 
case, one would be working towards an 
omnibus bill that would simultaneously 
pass the ABS draft into law and 
amend conflicting laws. Considering a 
compromise within the text of the ABS 
draft is a pragmatic alternative approach, 
in which case creating exceptions in the 
ABS framework can be considered.
Synergies between the ABS draft 
and existing laws are easier to address. 
Efficiencies can be gained through 
reliance on existing personnel working 
within existing regulatory frameworks, 
particularly with respect to procedures 
for the granting of access, monitoring 
and enforcement. For example, 
environmental authorities may have 
much of the capacity required to assess 
access applications, and quarantine 
authorities may be in a position and 
have a mandate to take a key role in 
local enforcement. In the agricultural 
sector, a country’s gene bank or breeding 
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programmes may already possesses 
many of the necessary institutional 
capacities that need to be included in the 
daily operation of an ABS regime that 
includes PGRFA within its scope.
At the end of this step, one should 
have a refined framework that links 
directly with existing frameworks, taking 
advantage of structures and capacities 
where possible and providing for 
exceptions in the event of unavoidable 
incompatibilities.
Step 9. Identification of 
most appropriate policy or 
legal instrument
This step addresses the question: what 
type of instrument is most appropriate 
to implement the framework developed 
so far? If in fact the type of instrument 
was already prescribed in the terms of 
reference handed down from higher 
political offices, it may not be open for 
consideration. Otherwise, it is useful to 
delay such a decision until this stage in 
the process, as the decision taken should 
reflect work that has been completed 
in the earlier steps. Different types of 
instrument suit different circumstances, 
but as a general principle, the lowest 
level of legal force necessary for the 
purpose should be adopted. Where the 
proposed framework requires changes 
in the policies and practices of national 
institutions and a signalling of objectives 
and intentions to foreign actors, a policy 
statement may be sufficient. This should 
not be seen as a ‘weak’ option. Policy 
statements, particularly where formally 
adopted, can have significant effects 
on the spending and staffing practices 
of institutions and on the way they 
interpret their mandates. Through this 
approach, it may be possible to achieve 
impacts similar to those attainable 
through legislative measures. This 
approach is probably best suited to a 
situation where decentralized regulation 
is desired and a regime will therefore 
be independently implemented by a 
range of lead agencies (with, perhaps, 
a minimal level of coordination). At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, a legislative 
instrument may be required where it 
has been determined that new offences 
and corresponding penalties should 
be established, or where institutional 
modification is needed, such as where 
changes to the powers of enforcement 
officers are needed, or where significant 
new funding and staffing resources have 
been agreed upon.
In cases where these are not 
necessary, a legislative instrument may 
still be considered for at least one of two 
reasons. First, it may be needed to ensure 
a more significant level of coordination 
or harmonization in existing institutional 
and legal frameworks. Second, it may be 
deemed necessary to indicate the level of 
political priority that is attached to ABS, 
a sensitive subject in many countries.
Between these two ends of the 
spectrum—policy statements and legis-
lation—are a range of options, such 
as subsidiary regulations, executive 
orders and similar instruments, which 
may vary considerably according to the 
traditions of individual jurisdictions. 
Such instruments are more flexible 
than legislative options, as they can 
be updated and otherwise amended 
without reference to legislatures, but 
they also are either dependent on parent 
legislation for, or completely lack, the 
budgetary and enforcement power of 
those legislative options.
Step 10. Drafting
The final step is to actually draft the 
instrument selected. Drafting of this 
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nature is a specialized field of endeavour 
and we do not purport to address 
processes involved other than to raise 
the two following issues.
First, the refined framework of 
options for change should be translated 
as clearly and precisely as possible, as 
ambiguities can have a negative impact 
on the way stakeholders react to a 
framework, as well as undermining its 
enforceability.
Second, it is important to ensure that 
the content and text of the instrument 
is consistent with the legal traditions 
of the country in which it is to be 
implemented. Legislative drafting is 
a complex skill and, where it has been 
determined that a legislative instrument 
is necessary, lawyers with experience in 
this area, from the country concerned, 
should lead the process. Most attorney 
generals’ chambers or ministries of 
justice will probably have drafting 
departments and many law schools may 
also have lecturers with the relevant 
experience. Experts from a variety of 
different kinds of organizations—CSOs, 
indigenous peoples organizations, 
international research organizations, 
private industry—can be introduced into 
the process to provide technical back-up. 
FAO and UNEP have standing budgets 
and in-house expertise to provide such 
assistance upon request from member 
states. The preparation of subsidiary 
regulations, executive orders and other 
similar instruments, if they are necessary, 
will also require drafting skills. The 
preparation of policy statements may be 
the exception to this pattern, depending 
upon the level of detail such a statement 
is intended to convey and the changes it 
is projected to effect.
Postscript: The 
methodology in  
summary form
Part I: Policy analysis
Step 1: Overall purpose
What is the overall purpose of the law?
Is the law to be developed in response 
to a generic higher level directive 
from within government that specifies 
the purpose? If so, what purpose is 
provided?
Is the exercise of investigating the 
law in response to pressure from non-
governmental groups? If so, what would 
the purpose of legislation be that would 
meet, at least partially, their demands?
Step 2: Component objectives
What lesser and included specific 
objectives are included within the 
overall purpose?
Are they different for different sectors or 
kinds of genetic resources?
Do they actually represent more detailed 
breakdown of the components of the 
overall purpose, or do they represent 
some qualitatively different priority?
Step 3: Baseline information
What information might you require 
to make an informed decision about 
the component objectives you have 
identified?
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If you can not get all the information you 
initially identify, what minimum subsets 
of that information is sufficient?
How can the necessary information be 
collected and synthesized? By whom, 
and through what processes?
Part II: Policy formulation
Step 4: Prerequisite conditions for 
success
What institutional capacities and 
human behaviours (preconditions) are 
necessary for the component objectives 
to be realized?
Step 5: Evaluation of preconditions
What gaps exist between the requisite 
preconditions and the situation on the 
ground in the country concerned?
What information do you need to 
critically assess those gaps?
Step 6: Validation of component 
objectives
What options are there for legal and 
policy interventions to close those gaps
Can those interventions be packaged 
within an ABS law?
What are the relative chances of success 
or failure for each option?
In the light of the viable options for 
change, are the identified component 
objectives likely to be effective? Do they 
represent approaches that are acceptable 
in the light of the standards, beliefs and 
precedents applicable in the country, i.e. 
is it politically feasible?
Step 7: Reconciliation and 
prioritization of options for change
Can the elements of legal or policy 
interventions be grouped according to 
their role or function.
Are any of the options repetitive? Are 
any irreconciliable? If so, is it possible 
that the component objectives need 
reconceptualization? Do some options 
need to be rejected?
Part III: Policy iteration and 
legal drafting
Step 8: External reconciliation of 
options for change
How do the grouped options ‘sit’ with 
existing laws and policies in the country 
concerned?
Step 9: Identification of basic legal 
approach and mechanism
What form of legal or policy instrument 
is most appropriate?
Step 10: Drafting
Who will take the next step, translating 
the framework developed in the previous 
steps into a formal legal instrument?
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Endnotes
 1 “Outcomes and Recommendations of the 
Meeting of ‘Biodiversity—the Megascience in 
Focus’”, UNEP/CBD/COP/8/INF/46. This is 
a report of a meeting hosted by the Brazilian 
government, 15-19 March 2006, immediately 
prior to the Eighth Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(COP 8), which involved participation of 
approximately 200 scientists from across Latin 
America. The report includes the statements 
that “[b]asic biological research is seriously 
hampered by many of the current national 
ABS regimes”, and “[d]istrust, rather than 
trust, is presently dominating the situation 
in many countries, hampering biological 
research. This holds for national as well as 
international research.” The participants 
included a recommendation that “[a]ll 
countries are encouraged to review their 
processes for permits on research, collection, 
import, and export of specimens to rationalize 
and streamline the ABS process. In addition, 
rules and regulations need to be practicable.” 
See also C. Correa, “Do national access 
regimes promote use of genetic resources and 
benefit sharing?”, Int. J. Environment and 
Sustainable Development, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2005; 
M. Halewood & R. Sood, “Genebanks and 
public goods: political and legal challenges 
to building collections for the international 
community,” prepared for the 20th session of the 
Genetic Resources Policy Committee (GRPC) 
of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) , August, 2006 
[unpublished]
2 The concept of perverse outcomes, basically 
counter-productive or otherwise unforeseen 
negative outcomes of policy intervention, 
is almost universally highlighted as a 
fundamental risk in all legislative and policy 
formulation activities in the literature. For 
example, see G.C. Thornton Legislative 
Drafting (LexisNexis UK, 1996), Bennion, F. 
A. R., Understanding Common Law Legislation: 
Drafting and Interpretation (OUP, 2001) and 
Seidman, R. B., Abeyesekere, N., Legislative 
Drafting for Democratic Social Change: A Manual 
for Drafters (Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
For a number of historical examples of the 
impact of government policies on research and 
development paths see Diamond, Jared, Guns, 
Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 
(New York, 1997). For the specific issue of 
perverse outcomes in access and benefit 
sharing policy see, for example, Correa, C., 
Do national access regimes promote the use of 
genetic resources and benefit sharing? (Int. J. 
Environment and Sustainable Development, 
Vol. 4, No. 4, 2005).
3 Fowler, C. and Hodgkin, T. 2004. Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: 
Assessing global availability. Annual Review 
of Environmental Resources 29: 10.1–10.37 at 
pp 10.14-10.17
4 Ibid.
5 However, of the pre-CBD legal regimes for 
access to genetic or biological resources, such 
as for laurel tree in Syria or the coco de mer 
nut in Seychelles, almost all were based on 
the physical nature of the material to which 
access was sought. This approach had the 
advantage of being extremely clear as to which 
activities did or did not fall within the scope of 
regulation, but the disadvantage remained of 
the rigidity of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
users and uses.
6 For the sake of brevity, the term NGO is here 
used to describe organizations that describe 
themselves as NGOs, together with civil 
society organizations (CSOs), or simply as 
‘civil society’.
7 The Shoals of Capricorn, Seeds for Life, the 
Eden Project and the International Cooperative 
Biodiversity Groups are probably the best 
known, primarily public supported, projects 
that have at least touched on ABS issues 
and have, to varying degrees, specifically 
incorporated benefit-sharing measures in their 
proposals. The collections maintained by the 
CGIAR and other regional or international 
centres of a similar nature also constitute 
what is, in essence, an ongoing ABS project. 
Probably, the highest volume of activity in 
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access to genetic resources tends to occur 
among public-sector institutions, such as 
research institutes and universities, within 
particular national or sub-regional borders, 
but rarely involves much in the way of direct 
benefit-sharing provisions. This is generally 
because, where the issue has been considered, 
the activities of national institutions tend to 
be accepted as a benefit in the sense that they 
are undertaken on behalf of the public of the 
particular country.
8 PEST, sometimes known as STEP, analysis is 
one element of a tool for assessing business 





12 Of course, in all but the rarest instances, it will 
not be possible to reach complete consensus on 
all aspects of policy development. However, 
to optimize the chances of successful 
implementation, one should aim for at least 
a compromise that all those involved can 
accept. 
13 This dynamic is very closely related to the 
reason that access issues were introduced 
into the CBD in the first place, namely the 
perception that recognizing and formalizing 
the potential value of biodiversity, in 
particular of the relatively low impact and 
potentially profitable activities associated 
with genetic resources, would allow for 
the capture of at least some of that value to 
support conservation efforts. It was felt that 
this approach would also promote the cause 
of conservation by highlighting biodiversity’s 
potential direct applied value, as well as its 
more traditionally accepted, but more remote, 
existence value. Another activity that countries 
are almost always seeking to preserve and 
promote is that of the exchange of genetic 
resources to support agricultural research 
and production. The exchange of a range of 
genetic resources, plant, animal and microbial, 
is so well established that it is often taken for 
granted. However, it is, in most cases, still an 
example of access to genetic resources and this 
must be borne in mind when developing an 
ABS framework.
14 Confusion about the application of ABS 
law to resolve orthodox natural resources 
exploitation issues is further clouded by a lack 
of clarity—distinguishing between something 
being accessed as a biological resource or as 
a genetic resource. The division between 
these two terms is not neat, inasmuch as the 
definition of genetic resource turns in part 
upon the use of the material in question. In 
the case of natural resources extraction, one is 
dealing with a traditional commodity question 
of price relative to quantity, i.e. the value of a 
tangible good with uses that do not involve 
the reproduction of the biological material 
involved. In the case of genetic resources, 
one is focusing more on the intangible quality 
of the material accessed, i.e. the genetic 
information encoded in a biological resource, 
and the intention on the part of the recipient to 
reproduce the material received or its genetic 
parts or components. Inevitably, it appears, 
the definition become functional in nature, 
turning on the intended use of the biological 
material. As a result, confusion still persists in 
some circles about the potential applicability 
of blanket access law for all biological 
materials. One optional approach—which is 
appealing in its conceptual simplicity—would 
be to say that all biological resources will be 
considered as genetic resources. However, 
this has a fundamental drawback: the effective 
regulation of the exchange of biological 
resources, as commodity transactions, is 
fairly straightforward, and consequently 
cheap, whereas the effective regulation of 
the exchange of genetic resources tends to 
be more complex, and expensive. As a result, 
making all biological resources subject to 
genetic resources regulation would submit a 
huge number of relatively routine transactions 
to a heavy burden of transaction costs, 
ranging from negotiations and monitoring 
to accounting for the costs and benefits of 
benefit-sharing mechanisms. At a minimum, 
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some form of exception will be necessary 
to allow for conventional activities that are 
almost universally accepted as beyond the 
scope of access to resources in genetic terms, 
such as trade in timber or foodstuffs. A useful 
starting point is to demarcate between the 
point where the use of a resource involves its 
direct consumption, and those using it must 
therefore seek a further supply to continue 
their activities, and between activities that 
involve cultivation or reproduction by some 
means and where the user does not need to 
secure an ongoing supply. Scenarios involving 
different resources and activities can then be 
tested against this demarcation to see which 
side of it they would fall, and hence some form 
of definition of access to genetic resources that 
suits national interests and objectives can be 
arrived at. 
  Another substantive decision that 
should be taken concerns the determination of 
how to define the actual material and activities 
that will be subject to the framework. Neither 
the CBD nor the International Treaty are 
particularly precise in this regard, although 
the latter does provide somewhat more detail 
than the former. The definitions of genetic 
resources and the provisions on scope in these 
two international agreements leave the main 
decisions to national implementation, and a 
failure to address the issue, usually through 
the simple adoption of the international 
definitions, can create a dangerous ambiguity 
in what is, and what is not, subject to regulation 
at national level. The refined framework that 
has been developed under this methodology 
should provide a clear indication as to how 
scope and definition should be constructed, 
and the main point here is that this is an 
issue that must be specifically considered and 
addressed. 
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Acronyms
ABS Access and Benefit 
Sharing
Bonn  Bonn Guidelines on 
Guidelines Access to Genetic  
 Resources and Fair and  
 Equitable Sharing of the  
 Benefits Arising out of  
 their Utilization
CBD Convention on Biological 
Diversity
CGIAR Consultative Group 
on International 
Agricultural Research
CGRFA [FAO] Commission on 
Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture
FAO Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the 
United Nations
GPA Global Plan of Action for 
the Conservation and 
Sustainable Utilization of 
Plant Genetic Resources 







and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore [of WIPO]
IP intellectual property
IPR intellectual property 
right
IPGRI International Plant 
Genetic Resources 
Institute
International  International Treaty  
Treaty  on Plant Genetic 
 Resources  
 for Food and Agriculture
NBSAP National Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan
NGO non-governmental 
organization
PEST political, economic, 
social, technological 
[analysis]
PGRFA Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture
R&D research and 
development
SWOT strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats 
[analysis]
TRIPS Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property 
Rights
WIPO World Intellectual 
Property Organization
